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Frederick C. DeCoste* Retrieving Positivism:
Law as Bibliolatry
I. Introduction
Legal positivism is a curious phenomenon in both its theoretical and
sociological parts.1 It is curious as theory because its very existence, as
theory, is often questioned,2 and because, even when its existence is
*Frederick C. DeCoste, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Alberta, Edmonton.
I am indebted to Hans Mohr and Brian Slattery of Osgoode Hall and to my colleague Richard
Bauman for reading with critical intelligence earlier drafts of this article.
1. And legal positivism - like any theory - is indeed a phenomenon of both parts because,
as theory, positivism is a belief which not only orients practice but which is constitutive of the
very possibility of practice. See for instance: Teubner, "After Legal Instrumentalism?" in
Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State (1985, G. Teubner, ed.) 299, 301 (arguing that "legal
theory ... forms part of the legal system and thus orients practice"); N.E. Simmonds, The
Decline of Juridical Reason:t Doctrine and Theory in Legal Order (1984) 29-30 (arguing that
"in examining the nature of legal science, we are studying an actual social phenomenon"
because "social reality consists, not of brute data ... but of actions and practices that can be
apprehended only by reference to some rationale, some meaning attached to the relevant
behaviour"); and R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986) 90 (submitting that "no firm line divides
jurisprudence from adjudication or any other aspect of legal practice") [Hereinafter, Empire].
These assertions with respect to the meaning of theory anticipate the more fundamental
question - which is beyond the purview of this essay - of the meaning of praxis and of the
relationship between theory, praxis and polity. For an illuminating discussion of these
questions in the context of political theory, see: W N. Sullivan, Reconstructing Public
Philosophy (1986), esp. Ch. 2 and 3.
2. See: N. MacCormick, LegalReasoning andLegal Theory (1978) 240:
"Among the most pointless questions which could be asked is whether [there is an]
essence of positivism; there is no such thing as an essence of positivism. The term
positivism serves only to characterize an approach to or a programme for legal theory
held by some theorist or theorists. There is a range of possible uses of the term from
which all one can do is stipulatively select that which characterizes the approach one
wishes to defend - or attack." J. Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and
Morality (1979) 37: "The perennial and inexhaustible nature of the controversy
concerning the positivist analysis of the law is due in no small measure to the elusive
meaning of 'positivism' in legal philosophy. True, it is well established that legal
positivism is essentially independent (even though not historically unrelated) both of the
positivism of nineteenth-century philosophy and of the logical positivism of the present
century. But the great variation between different positivist theories of law and the large
variety of philosophical motivations permeating the work of the non-positivists indicate
the difficulty, perhaps the impossibility, of identifying legal positivism at its source -
in a fundamental positivist philosophical outlook." And R. S. Summers, Essays in
Legal Philosophy (1968) 16 (arguing that "it would be best in legal philosophy to drop
the term 'positivist', for it is now radically ambiguous and dominantly pejorative."). For
summaries of different meanings of positivism, see: K. Olivecrona, Law as Fact (1971)
50-62; Hart, "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals" (1958), 71 Harv. L
Rev. 595, 601-602; and Summers, "The New Analytical Jurists" (1966), 41 N.YU. L
Rev. 861, 889.
56 The Dalhousie Law Journal
admitted, the nature of the theory,3 and who does and does not qualify
as an adherent 4 most often remains in dispute. It is curious sociologically
because rare is the legal theoretician who forthrightly endorses positivism:
positivists, it would appear, are as scarce as the formalists among whom
they used to be numbered.5
In this essay, I attempt to construct a model of the positivist "version" 6
of law which shows this reticence to be both unwarranted and - for
3. See for instance: Coleman, "Negative and Positive Positivism" (1982), 11 J. Leg. Stud 139
(arguing that in the final analysis, there are three separate varieties of positivism); and Fiss,
"The Varieties of Positivism" (1981), 90 Yale L J. 1007 (arguing that legal positivism is "one
variant of ethical positivism" which "insist[s] on the distinction between 'ought' and 'is' " and
that a commitment to legal positivism does not involve a commitment to cognitive or logical
positivism).
4. Ronald Dworkin is most often the object of such debate. See: Weinreb, "Law as Order"
(1978), 91 Har. L Rev. 909; Waluchow, "Herculean Positivism" (1985), 5 (2. J Leg. Stud
187; and Burton, "Ronald Dworkin and Legal Positivism" (1987), 73 IowaL Rev. 109.
5. See: Boyle, "Thomas Hobbes and the Invented Tradition of Positivism: Reflections on
Language, Power and Essentialism" (1987), 135 U Penn. L. Rev. 383, 347-354. See also:
H.-G. Gadamer, Truh and Method (1986, G. Barden and J. Cumming, trans.) 471 (arguing
that "legal positivism, which would like to limit legal reality entirely to the established law and
its correct application, probably has no supporters today."). This characterization does not, of
course, apply to those writers who are now conceived as "classical" positivists. I refer to J.
Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832) [Hereinafter, Province]; to H. L. A.
Hart, The Concept of Law (1961) [Hereinafter, Concept]; and to H. Kelsen, Pure Theory of
Law (1967, 2nd ed., M. Knight, trans.). But this phenomenon itself speaks to the evanescence
of positivism: surely it is surprising that works so recent as Hart's and Kelsen's should be
invoked as historic instances. For a recent discussion of "the classical form of positivism"
which includes Hart as a proponent, see: Soper, "Making Sense of Modem Jurisprudence: The
Paradox of Positivism and the Challenge for Natural Law" (1988), 22 Creighton L
Rev. 67,80.
6. I use the term "version" in the same fashion as does Nelson Goodman: see, N. Goodman,
Ways of Worldmaking (1978) and Languages of Art An Approach to a Theory of Symbols
(1968), hereinafter referred to respectively as Ways and Languages Goodman's founding
proposition is twofold. that the meaning of the world is the world and that there are as many
worlds as there are meanings. (Ways, 3) For Goodman, therefore, "reality is relative" (ibid,
20) and there are "multiple actual worlds" (ibid, 2). Versions and visions are ways of creating
those worlds by giving meaning to the world. They are ways of world making "each
participangs] in the formation and characterization of the world"; (Languages, 40) and "our
universe consists of these ways, rather than of a world or of worlds." (Ways, 3)
Yet, according to Goodman, they are different ways. A version is a description of the world
as something and, therefore, has "truth-value" (/bid) A vision, on the other hand, is a depiction.
Instead of propounding a world descriptively, it proposes a world representationally; and
instead of possessing truth-value, it possesses rightness. Rightness is a matter of "ultimate
acceptability" (ibid, 139); and acceptability is "primarily a matter of fit" (ibid, 138) [In the
end, Goodman appears to abandon truth entirely- he instead translates the truth of versions to
correctness and then subsumes both correctness and rightness under fit (See: Ways, 138; and
Languages, 264-265) That is, "a statement is true and.., a representation is right, for a world
it fits" (Ways, 132). But this does not at all detract from the utility of his founding distinction
between versions and visions as different ways of world making because to describe and to
represent a world remain different even if the tests for each reduces to acceptability. In any
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reasons with which I conclude - tragically counterproductive. 7
Preliminary to undertaking that task, however, and by way of structuring
the argument which follows, I must first clear the ground of two
fundamental difficulties which this curious state of theoretic affairs
presents to the critic.
The difficulties are these. On the one hand, because positivism is
apparently so evanescent, one's criticisms may appear to be frivolous:
simply, why bother criticizing that which does not exist or that to which
none subscribe. Much more ominously, however, one's criticism may
appear dishonest. For if the existence and nature of positivism is indeed
so contestable and so elusive, any version which the critic offers as an
object of critical inquiry may itself be criticized as a product of the critic's
event, his ultimately equalling truth and rightness with fit is unsurprising since both truth and
rightness are relative to a world each creates.] Under the view taken here, positivism is a
version of law both because it conceives itself as a description of legal phenomena and because
it proclaims and defends its description as true.
This characterization is fundamental to any critical assessment of positivism (a project
beyond the purposes of the present essay) because it establishes the meaning of truth for such
an assessment. For if positivism is indeed a version and if, following Goodman, truth is relative
(because there is no world which is "undescribed, undepicted, unperceived": ibid, 4), its "truth
cannot be defined or tested by agreement with the world" (ibid, 17). Nor, for the same reason,
is it possible to compare it with other, different versions: because they are different, versions are
incommensurable (ibid, 4-6). Rather, a version - including the positivist version of law -
can only be "taken to be true when it offends no unyielding beliefs and none of its own
precepts" (ibid, 17). Goodman includes among unyielding beliefs "long-lived reflections of
laws of logic, short-lived reflections of recent observations and other convictions and prejudices
ingrained with varying degrees of firmness" (ibid, 17); and among precepts, "choices among
alternative frames of reference, weightings and derivational bases." (ibid) Truth, therefore, is
not only relative, it is flexible: "far from being a solemn and severe master," it is "a docile and
obedient servant." (ibid, 18)
In consequence, in testing the "truth-value" of positivism as a version, one would need to
inquire whether it offends 'any unyielding beliefs" or "any of its own precepts." If, therefore,
we were to inquire whether the positivist version is demonstrable on its own terms, we could
propose that we are testing it on both bases - the former because it is a "long-lived reflection"
of logic that propositions be in some sense (and not, note, in a logical positivist sense)
verifiable; and the former because, as we shall see, choice of a particular frame of reference is
critical to the positivist project.
7. My purpose, I should make abundantly dear, is to establish a foundation - indeed an
object - for subsequent criticism. Charles Taylor claims that epistemic projects (which, in this
essay, I will claim positivism is clearly one: see infra, parts II and III) have moral consequences
which implicate certain positions in moral, political and social theory. See: Taylor,
"Overcoming Epistemology" in After Philosophy: End or Transformation? (1987), K. Baynes
et at eds.) 464-488. Elsewhere, I will take Taylor's suggestion as a point of departure to argue
that positivism implicates a politics of estrangement between rulers and the ruled (I begin this
undertaking in "Radical Discourse in Legal Theory: Hart and Dworkin," forthcoming, (1990),
21 Ottawa L Rev.); elsewhere too I will inquire (see: supra, note 6 and infra, note 108 and
accompanying text) whether we can, as a legal theoretical matter, avoid this form of polity.
(see: "Desire and the Word: Interpreting Law as Interpretation", forthcoming).
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manipulative manufacture: the critic, it will be said, has created a "straw-
person" for the sole purpose of an easy display of critical vivisection.'
The first objection - that of frivolity - is, I think, easily set aside. If
the existence of positivism can be seriously9 contested, it is because the
legal academy is so enthralled a captive of the positivist programme.
Positivism's alleged translucence is, in this sense, itself manufactured:
positivism does not appear to us because we so much "belong"' 0 to it.
And because we do belong, we are forgetful - we have amnesia -
about-our ever having assented." I shall attempt to cure this forgetfulness
by rendering distinct the "positivist enterprise"' 2 and by persuading that
that rendition makes sense.
The second objection is much more troublesome. How, after all, does
one convince of veracity in construction when the end in final view is
8. This counter-criticism is usually accusatory in form and tone: the critic's criticism, it is said,
is without force and effect because she has criticized a "strawman", a caricature of a real
position to which none would or does subscribe. "Strawman-ism" has become a popular idiom
in recent jurisprudential debate, especially to those defending mainstream versions of law
against the work of critical legal scholars. See, for instance: Ewald, "Unger's Philosophy: A
Critical Legal Study" (1988), 97 Yale L J 665, 754, 691 and 702 (arguing that the version
of liberalism which Unger criticizes is a "straw-person" because "it is dubious that [it was] ever
held by anybody at all" and attributing Unger's mistake to his being "in control neither of the
literature he cites, nor of his own arguments"); Langille, "Revolution Without Foundation: The
Grammar of Scepticism and Law" (1988), 33 McGillL J. 451,486 (submitting that "the legal
theorists under attack as 'mainstream' or 'liberal' all hold more sophisticated theories about
legal reasoning, the requirements of legal certainty or determinacy and the ideal of the rule of
law than those ascribed to them"); Stick, "Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?" (1986), 100 Harp. L
Rev. 332 (commenting that "many observers have noted that strong critics in assembling the
target of 'liberal' law for destruction engage in the exercise of constructing a 'straw-man' ");
Krygier, "Critical Legal Studies and Social Theory - A Response to Alan Hunt" (1987), 7
Of J. Leg. Stud 26, 28 (arguing that in critical characterizations of liberalism, "the arguments
of individuals are rarely analyzed singly or at length but are briefly and abstractly characterized
and dissolved into the one, antinomy - ridden portrait" and that the "claims attributed to
them ... are at times the opposite of what [they] believed"); and Finnis, "On the Critical Legal
Studies Movement" (1985), 30 Am J Juris. 21, 42 (arguing that Unger "distorts our human
situation as that situation is understood in the social theory of Aristotle and ... Aquinas").
More hopeful responses to critical scholarship, especially Unger's, have, of course, also been
offered. See: "Unger Symposium" (1987), 81 Nw. U. L Rev. 589-951; and Rorty, "Unger,
Castoriadis and the Romance of a National Future" (1988), 82 Nw. U. L Rev. 335, 351
(arguing, among other things, that Unger's work "has a better chance than most to be linked,
in the history books, with some... world-transforming event.").
9. I do not mean to imply - nor do I believe - that such a contest can ever be intelligible;
I mean only to say that the disputants can take seriously the contest only because they have
forgotten that the contest makes no sense.
10. See: Simmonds, supra, note 1, 29.
11. I borrow this metaphor from Fraser, "Legal Amnesia: Modernism versus the Republican
Tradition in American Legal Thought" (1984), 60 Telos 15. On the nature of our assent, see:
infr, notes 99, 105 and 106 and accompanying text.
12. See: Boyle, supra, note 5, 390.
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denunciatory deconstruction? 13 The very project appears an exercise in
self-interest and self-fulfilment. One could rejoin, of course, that this is
always the case - that "re-presentation" of the critical object is a
necessary condition for any critical practice. 14 Indeed, one could even go
the extra aepistemic mile to proclaim that criticism is prejudice because
prejudice is the only form of virtue available to us. 5
None of this, however, solves the critical problem in this instance.
Because the positivist oeuvre is itself the object of critical contest or
judgement, the critic is faced with a problem critically prior to the issue
of the possibility of fidelity to (or the need for prejudice towards) the
oeuvre once it is found. Simply, there is here no one text or group of texts
which, without more, constitutes the critical object. Just the contrary: the
construction of the oeuvre is, in this case, itself, the necessary first step in
the critical project. And it is this necessity which is problematic. The
literature - which I will allege is positivist - does not offer a
homogeneous view in all its parts. But not only that: the parts not only
conceive of themselves as being distinct, they also generally conceive of
themselves as being in opposition.16
Now one could - and quite successfully, I think - propose that
while the literature admittedly fails to present "a unified system", it
nonetheless is unified as "a family of ideas" that shares a "deep structure";
the oeuvre would then be constructed by disclosing "this hidden
framework of ideas." 17 But such circuitous sophistication is not, I think,
at all necessary here simply because, in this instance, the critical object is
much more directly accessible. A direct construction is possible because
13. See: supra, note 7.
14. See: Hernadi, "Introduction: Criticism as Representation, Evaluation and Communica-
tion" in What is Criticism? (1981, P. Hernadi, ed.) xi.
15. See: Fish, "Demonstration versus Persuasion: Two Models of Critical Activity", ibid, 30
arguing that "prejudicial and perspectival perception is all there is, and the question is from
which of equally interested perspectives will the text be constituted". I will elsewhere indicate
(see: "Desire and the Word: Interpreting Law as Interpretation", forthcoming) that Fish's is a
position which I endorse fully but not completely: that is, while I accept his historicist premises
and his critical argument, I dissent from his ontic conclusions.
16. That is, none thinks itself the successor of another; and each thinks itself as
transformatively displacing the other. I am here thinking in particular of the self-conceptions
of Hart and Dworkin. In Concept (supra, note 5, at 76, 95 & 151), Hart proclaims his work
not only distinct from Austin's (Province, supra, note 5), but as constituting an entirely new
beginning, "a fresh start", in which alone "the heart of a legal system" - its very "essence" -
is discernible. So too Dworkin in Taking Rights Seriously (1977), 22 & 45: his is not an
amendment of Hart; it is, instead, "a general attack" which seeks to "shake ... loose" from
prior theory so that "a model truer to the complexity and sophistication" of law may be built
(Hereinafter, TRS).
17. This, of course, was Unger's strategy in constructing his version of liberalism. See: R. M.
Unger, Knowledge and Politics (1975) 8.
60 The Dalhousie Law Journal
the literature both shares a common "programme"18 and implicates
common results. The programme to which I refer, consists of a version of
law which defines a peculiarly epistemic project for legal theory and
practice.' 9 By results, I mean the moral consequences which that project
implicates. Together this project and these consequences, I argue, both
constitute the positivist oeuvre and qualify literature for membership in
that oeuvre: together, that is, they are its only unity.20
In this essay, I make the first of these arguments. 2' I will proceed as
follows. First, I will provide a general description of the version of law in
terms of which alone the positivist project makes sense. Second, I shall
attempt to draw from that description a fuller account of the positivist
project and, more particularly, of the sorts of claims which positivism
must make in order either to make intelligible or to justify its version of
law. I will then conclude with some remarks concerning the significance
to legal theory and practice of the legal academy's continuing seduction
by the currency of positivism.
II. Describing Positivism
[T]he business of the court [is] neither more nor less than that of declaring
the meaning of a law in respect of a contingent occurrence.
- Michael Oakeshott22
18. See: MacCormick, supra, note 2.
19. This could be put another way: because the literature shares a project - i.e., a version
both of a problem and of what can possibly qualify as a solution - and because that problem
and that method are only intelligible given certain premises about law, the literature is to that
extent operating from a common version of law. However stated - whether, that is, the
version implicates the project or the project, the version - the point is simple enough: the
literature only makes sense and, more to the point, can only be made to make sense, in terms
of an interdependence between a defined project and a defining framework.
This method of construction is not, I hasten to add, mine alone. Helmut Dubiel, for instance,
deploys a similar approach in construing the oeuvre of the Frankfurt School: the texts there at
issue, he claims, are, despite their very real differences, part of the same oeuvre because each
is "a historically varying answer to an identical, invariant framework of 'points of inquiry' "
which together constitute "an orienting frame of reference". See: H. Dubiel, Theory and
Politics: Studies in the Development of Critical Theory (1985, B. Gregg, trans.) 7-10. So too
here: positivist texts are positivist because they share "an orienting frame of reference" which
is composed of and defined by a "structure of points of inquiry".
20. 1 think this construction is self-contained and self-standing. There is, however, a caveat:
since this construction violates the self-understanding of much of the literature, whether it, in
the last analysis, avoids the charge of manufacture and manipulation can only be assessed in
terms of its persuasiveness, which, with Fish, (see: supra, note 14), 1 believe the only
demonstration possible.
21. I make elsewhere the second argument concerning the moral implications of the version
of positivism I establish here: see, supra, note 7.
22. See: Oakeshott, "The Rule of Law" in M. Oakeshott, On History and Other Essays
(1983) 147.
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[L]egal practice is an exercise in interpretation.
- Ronald Dworkin 23
I claim that for positivists, law is bibliolatry. I mean by this simply that
they view legal practice as largely a practice of interpreting authoritative
texts.24 Now this view of law is not at all uncommon; indeed, it may even
be said to be hegemonic.2 5 My view that this is the positivist view may,
however, appear irregular if only because many who subscribe to a
textualist view of legal practice do not view themselves as positivists.26 I
must, therefore, make a case for their inclusion; and this I will do by
arguing that the textualist view is only intelligible in terms of a
background framework which itself is indisputably positivist.27 After so
doing, I will explore the deep structure of that framework; I undertake
this task because the deep structure that stands behind the positivist
framework permeates the whole of the positivist project and is, in large
measure, responsible for its ultimate theoretic fragility.
23. See: Dworkin, "Law as Interpretation" in The Politics of Interpretation (1982, W. J. T.
Mitchell, ed.) 249. See also: Empire supra, note 1, 14 ("law [is] an argumentative social
practice"), 87, 410 ("law is an interpretive concept"). Dworkin's view is neither new nor
peculiar to legal theorists (it, of course, is held by other legal theorists: see, for instance, R. N.
Moles, Definition and Rule in Legal Theory: A Reassessment of H. L A. Hart and the Positivist
Tradition (1987) 259 - "the existence of a legal rule is essentially constructive and
interpretative"). Hobbes, for instance, thought the legal enterprise implicated an interpretive
project: "All Laws, written, and unwritten, have need of Interpretation.. [See: Leviathan
(1968, C. B. MacPherson, ed.) 322] And it is common practice among literary theorists to
invoke law as the paradigmatic interpretive project. See for instance: Hirsch, "Meaning and
Significance Re-interpreted" (1985), 11 Crit Inq. 202, 219 (submitting that "law ought to be
a paradigm for the serious practice of interpretation"); and Gadamer, Truth and Method, supra,
note 5, 292 (arguing that "legal hermeneutics is able to point out what the real procedure of
the human sciences is").
24. A caution: this view does not imply anything with respect to how the text is defined. See:
infra, Part II.
25. The whole of legal education, for instance, can be aptly conceived as literacy training. Law
students are taught which sort of texts comprise the legal oeuvre and how texts of that sort
ought be interpreted and all this so that they may later "join the practice of law with that
furniture in place and with a shared understanding" of what law can and cannot be. See:
Empire, supra, note 1, 91; and infra, note 99. Other, less careerist, interpretations of the quality
of the literacy are, of course, available. For a feminist interpretation, see: "Symposium: Women
in Legal Education -Pedagogy, Law, Theory and Practice" (1988), 38 J. Leg. Ed, 1.
26. Ronald Dworkin is the archetypical instance: see, TRS, supra, note 16, 16-45; and
Empire, supra, note 1, 33-35, 37-43.
27. At this stage, I will argue only that the views of theorists such as Dworkin can only make
sense in terms of a paradigm which is, by any account, positivist. Elsewhere (see: "Desire and
the Word: Interpreting Law as Interpretation", forthcoming; and supra, note 7) I make a
detailed case with respect to their positivism; this I shall do by analyzing Dworkin's work in
terms of the dimensions identified in this essay as definitive of positivism. I choose Dworkin
for this analysis for purely tactical reasons: for if Dworkin is, on this account, a positivist, other
lesser lights who disclaim positivism using his work are also positivists.
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1. Surface Taxonomy
First then: what is required in order to make sense of the proposition that
law is an interpretive activity? Well the proposition at least requires that
there be something to be interpreted - that there be an interpretandum
which constitutes the object of interpretive activity. And if there is to be
an interpretandum, there must also be a text; and for there to be a text,
there must be a epistolary inscription of some sort or other. These
requirements follow, I think, as a matter of course for any bibliocentric
activity.28 The positivist version of law as bibliolatry differs, however, in
its understanding of the significance of "the inscriptional text". 29 For not
only is the text authoritative (and this, positivism shares with all
bibliolatry), it is authoritative for a peculiar reason - it is authoritative
because it is viewed as having been posited.
For the positivist, the positum is the interpretandum and the text is,
therefore, postulational and not merely - or, in some instances, at all -
propositional. That is, the text is a claim 30 and not merely a proposal or
commendation. It is just this appraisal of textual significance that, I now
propose, is the core of positivism. For from it arises, necessarily, the
taxonomy that is constitutive of the positivist version of law.
To declare both that the text is a claim and that it is authoritative for
just that reason is to construe and structure the relationship between the
text and the interpreter in terms of rule-making and rule-following.
Simply: the text has authoritative significance for the interpreter because
- and only because - it is a positum, a claim-to-be-followed; and it can
only have such significance if there is a positor. Together these
propositions require and constitute a cleavage between rule-making and
rule-following. And that cleavage is the positivist taxonomy: for law, for
the positivist, consists precisely of this bicameral division of law-labour.
The rule-maker is the positor of texts which are authoritative because
they have been posited, and the rule-follower is the interpreter of the text
whose interpretations consist in following the claim which is the text.3'
28. For a very useful account of the meaning of interpretation and of interpretive practice, see:
Brewer, "Figuring the Law: Holism and Topological Inference in Legal Interpretation" (1988),
97 Yale L J. 823.
29. Ibid, 824.
30. But for the theoretic associations that such a description might connote (see: supra,
Province, note 5), the text could just as easily and appropriately be said to be a demand. I use
the term "claim" to avoid such connotations because the text as claim does not, without a
political theoretical more, imply anything with respect to the political character of the positor.
31. For this reason - and as we shall discuss more fully below: see: infra, Part II - all
positivism is "textual positivism" (see: Hutchinson, "Part of An Essay on Power and
Interpretation (With Suggestions on How to Make Bouillabaisse)" (1985), 60 NYU. L. Rev.
850, 862); the turn to the text, and to interpretation, are its very fabric and each is, for that
reason, inevitable (see: Kennedy, "The Turn to Interpretation" (1985), 58 S. CaL L Rev., 251).
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Now a number of objections may be raised regarding this construal of
positivism. First, it may be declared self-contradicting inasmuch as it
arises from the assertion that law is an interpretive activity and yet
concludes by identifying two foci of law activity, one of which - rule-
making - is not at all interpretive. I intend to deal with this objection in
a different context elsewhere.32 Suffice it to say here that positivism, in a
very real, if paradoxic, sense, degrades rule-making activity by viewing
rule-interpreting as the paradigmatic instance of law-activity.33
My version of positivism may also perhaps be criticized as eccentric.
Certainly, positivism is generally 34 characterized in terms of the
separation of law and morals: the legal positivist, it is said, is one who
maintains that law and morals are separate.35 It is, of course, a weak
defence to this charge that others also construe positivism in a fashion
roughly similar to my own.36 I will, instead, offer a positive defence in
32. See: supra, note 7, "Desire and the Word: Interpreting Law as Interpretation",
forthcoming. And this is to pass on the most obvious rejoinder, i.e., that rule-making too is
interpretive. I pursue this argument neither here nor elsewhere because, in my view, it hides
more that it discloses.
33. See for instance: J. Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (1975) 129-31 (arguing that "law
applying" rather than "law-creating" is central to the understanding of law); Dworkin, TRS,
supra, note 16, chp. 4, esp. 82-86, 113-115 (distinguishing between the political obligation of
legislatures and courts in terms policy and principle, reserving for courts the practice of
principle and characterizing legislatures as preference counters); and Dworkin A Matter of
Principle (1985) 71 (describing courts as "an institution that calls some issues from the
battleground of power politics to the forum of principle").
Dworkin offers a more sophisticated version of legislative obligation in Empire (supra, note
1). While in TRS he was tentative in suggesting that "there is perhaps some limit to the
arbitrariness of the distinctions the legislature may make" (TRS, supra, note 16, 114), he now
holds "lawmakers" to "a legislative principle" of political integrity according to which they are
"to try to make the total set of laws morally coherent" (Empire, supra, note 1, 176). Yet the
fundamentals remain the same: his "main concern" remains "with the adjudicative principle"
of integrity (ibid, 176); and judges remain "in a very different position from legislators"
because they "must make their common-law decisions on grounds of principle, not policy"
(ibid, 244).
34. Which is to say, not invariably: see, Simmonds, supra, note 1, 22 (arguing that positivism
is "the claim that all laws emanate from authoritative sources in the sense that they have been
deliberately laid down or accepted"); and, at least in part, Raz, supra note 2, 38 (defining
positivism as "the view that the law is posited, is made law by the activities of human beings").
35. This view has its origin in Austin's famous epigram - "The existence of law is one thing;
its merit or demerit is another" (see: Province, supra, note 5, 184); and more recently in Hart's
redaction of Austin (see: Concep, supra, note 5, esp. Ch. IX.). This version has generally been
endorsed by positivist friend and foe alike. See, for instance: Olivecrona, supra, note 2; S. I.
Shuman, Legal Positivism: Its Scope and Limitation (1963) 11-40; M. J. Detmold, The Unity
of Law and Morals: A Refutation of Legal Positivism (1984) 21-23; J. Murphy and J.
Coleman, The Philosophy of Law (1984) 29; P. Soper, A Theory of Law (1984) 101-102; and
D. Beyleveld and R. Brownsword, Law As A Moral Judgement (1986) 1-4. By implication at
least, Dworkin too appears to share this view: see, TRS, supra, note 16, 17, 60f; and Empire,
supra, note 1, 96-98.
36. For instance: Simmonds supra, note 70; and (in part) Raz, supra, note 2.
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two parts. I will argue first that the normal version of positivism confuses
consequences for cause; I will then argue that this confusion arises from
confusing legal with logical positivism.
The first line of defence arises from a claim that is coeval to the
division between rule-making and rule-following. The claim is this:37 that
rule-making and rule-following are different because it is possible to
follow rules and that it is possible to follow rules because rules are, in
some fashion or another, knowable. To this extent, at least, the positivist
project 38 is epistemic: that is, an epistemic demonstration is a necessary 39
condition for the project's success because the project can only possibly
be sustained if knowledge is possible.
Now, as we shall later discover,40 such a demonstration is itself only
possible in terms of a very specific "construal of knowledge". 41 For now
I wish only to contend that the law/morality division is positivism's
reduction of that construal. The division, that is, constitutes a particular
kind of epistemic claim - that what is "out-there" (the rules) is
knowable because the knowing subject (the rule-follower) is, and can be,
socially and historically disengaged. This characterization sheds new light
on and provides theoretic substance to the traditional statement: a
positivist is indeed one who thinks law and morality are separate because
he thinks it possible to know law without moral appraisal or engagement;
and he thinks it important to be able to so know because he works within
and wishes to maintain the founding division between rule-making and
rule-following. Viewed in this fashion, the law/morality split is an
epistemic consequence of the positivist framework: while it is necessary
to sustain the framework, it does not itself constitute the framework.42
37. We will consider this claim more fully later: see infra Part I1.
38. I define the positivist project in detail infra; Part III.
39. But, as well shall see, it is not a sufficient condition: see, infra Part III.
40. See, infra Part III.
41. See: Taylor, supra, note 7, 479. I shall later appropriate Taylor's argument that this
construal implicates a representational view of knowledge (i.e., that knowing is "a certain
relation holding between what is 'out-there' and certain inner states": ibid, 467) and a socially
and historically eviscerated view of the knowing subject (ibid., 466, 471): see, infra, Part III.
Elsewhere (see, supra, note 7), I shall argue with Taylor that together these implications
comprise "a moral ideal" (ibid, 470) which, has moral and spiritual consequences" (ibid, 473)
which, in turn, inform and require certain versions of moral, social and political theory (ibid,
472, 4801).
42. Nor, viewed in this fashion, does the law/morality split require the legal positivist to be
a logical positivist: see infra, note 51 and accompanying text. A note on pronouns. I believe
that the work of feminist theoreticians - along with the work of liberation theologians - to
be the site most likely to produce a vocabulary which will provide a moral space for both the
criticism of the present and for the articulation of a grammar of a human future. And because
I so believe, I deploy female pronoun designations whenever, throughout this essay, I speak
from the perspective of those who are the objects of those who share the construction of the
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The second defence arises from a particular use to which the law/
morality distinction is often put. I refer to its usage as shorthand for
distinguishing between legal positivism and natural law theory.43 What
distinguishes legal positivism from natural law, it is said, is that the one
and not the other denies a necessary connection between law and
morality. Now, notwithstanding that some legal positivists have taken
time to deny a connection between legal and logical positivism,44 this
usage can lead to the conflation of legal and logical positivism - legal
positivism can become equated with a law/morality split defined along
logical positivist lines. And when this is done, the split becomes the
misunderstood whole and heart of legal positivism.
I use the term logical positivism to refer to that brand of twentieth
century epistemology best represented by A.J. Ayer's Language, Truth
and Logic4 5 and according to which "the meaning of any statement is
shown by the way in which it could be verified." 46 This proposition,
which became known as the Verification Principle, sought to establish a
"general criterion of significance" 47 which would condemn to cognitive
present. When, however, I speak for those who are now empowered moral agents, I shall use
masculine pronouns.
My point in so doing is not a demographic one: the fact that most of those who have moral
responsibility in and for the construction of the present are male, does not, without more, carry
theoretic significance. (Accord: J. Grimshaw, Philosophy and Feminist Thinking (1986) 36,
arguing that the dominance of males in philosophy does not alone "establish the 'maleness' of
philosophy in any real important sense.") And my point arises just from that: that viewed
theoretically the sexual demographics of empowerment are significant because those
demographics have resulted in the exclusion of women from the vocabulary and grammar of
power (ibid, 370. The voice in much mainstream literature can, in consequence, be viewed a
male voice - the voice, that is, of those who are enabled moral agents in history. Some
feminists have subjected legal theory to precisely this analysis. See for instance: Hanen,
"Feminism, Objectivity and Legal Truth" in Feminist Perspectives: Philosophical Essays on
Method and Morals (1988, L. Code, et a, eds.) 29 (analyzing Dworkin along these lines);
Stubbs, "Feminism and Legal Positivism" (1986), 3 Aust J. Law & Soc'y 63 (arguing that "the
conceptual framework of legal positivism ... has very effectively constrained the development
of a feminist critique of law"); Mossman, "Feminism and Legal Method: The Difference It
Makes" (1986), 3 AusL J. Law & Soc'y 30 (arguing that "feminism has a power to transform
the perspective of legal method"); and Spivak, "The Politics of Interpretation" in G.C. Spivak,
In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics (1988) 118, 130 (arguing that Dworkin's
discussion of law as interpretation is "narrow and gender-specific, rather than unusual").
43. See, for instance: Murphy and Coleman, supra; note 35, 13 and 22; and Beyleveld and
Brownsword, supra, note 35, 2.
44. See most notably: Hart, "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals", supra, note
2, 624-629. Others, of course, have sought to establish just such a connection: see, for instance
- Shuman, supra, note 5 (arguing not only that a legal positivist is one who maintains that
law and morals are separate, but also that a legal positivist must maintain a certain - quite
nearly logical positivist - view with respect to the nature of morals).
45. A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (1946,2nd ed.).
46. See: G. J. Wamock, English Philosophy Since 1900 (1966) 30.
47. Ibid
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and linguistic insignificance any statement - including, notably, the
whole of moral statements - not empirically verifiable. Now one can be
a legal positivist without being a logical positivist - one can, that is,
claim a separation between law and morals without subscribing to the
logical positivist test of sense.48 The converse, however, is not true: if one
is a logical positivist, one would necessarily have to be a legal positivist
otherwise one simply could not speak of law.4 9
The logic of these positions is easily confused and especially so, when
the law/morality distinction is deployed to distinguish legal positivism
from natural law. This is so because natural law theory is most
appropriately conceived as the very antithesis of logical positivism: that
is, natural law is fundamentally the claim that moral statements are
meaningful because they are accessible and verifiable through the
practice of practical reasoning.so And when the logic is confused -
when, that is, legal positivism becomes equated with a logical positivist
epistemology - the law and morality distinction ceases to be an
epigrammatic usage and becomes instead the whole of a re-defined legal
positivism.5
Finally my version may be condemned as incomplete for failing to
account for case law. This criticism would probably take the form of a
counterclaim - that decisional law52 cannot be analyzed as "a body of
48. See: Soper, supra, note 35, 159 and 160; and Beyeveld and Brownsword, supra, note 35,
4-7; and Fiss, supra; note 3, 1016.
49. If law is, from the knower's perspective, comprised of moral statements - if, that is, the
knower cannot know without moral engagement - then the logical positivist must necessarily
stand mute because law would be for him meaningless and nonsensical.
50. Finnis' is the best recent statement of this view. See: J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural
Rights (1980) 18, 103, 280. One might add that, properly conceived, the natural law view
neither implicates nor requires the assertion that immoral laws are not laws: ibid 25f.
51. None of this is to deny, however, that logical and legal positivism do share other less
central characteristics. Chief among these, I think, is the value of neutrality of facts. Both
positivisms view facts as independent from the concepts used to describe or express them. In
the case of legal positivism, this gives rise to the epistemic proposal of the disengaged subject
to whom law-facts are neutrally available in the interpretive act. But similarity along these lines
ought not be surprising since "the founding principles of any lbsitive science", legal or other,
include "value-neutrality". See: Z. Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters: Modernity, Post-
Modernity and Intellectuals (1987) 174. See also the discussion in Beyleveld and Brownsword,
supra, note 35, 4-7.
Nor, of course, is value-neutrality the only dimension they share. I elsewhere argue (see:
supra, note 7) that legal positivism constitutes an ethos which implicates moral consequences
which themselves implicate - or, at least, tend to associate with - certain moral, social and
political theories. The moral theory which is associated is, at least, a sceptical one - that
people neither have, nor possibly can, come to a shared understanding of the good. And in the
moral sense, then, legal positivism differs from logical positivism only in degree - while the
one is sceptical about knowledge of the good, the other declares that such knowledge is
impossible.
52. Or, at least, that decisional law which is not directly a commentary on a statutory text.
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posited rules". 3 Now one could easily avoid this charge simply be
pointing to any number of positivists who hold just the opposite position.
MacCormick, for instance, opines that any differences in "the process of
reasoning from or with precedent... from that of reasoning from or with
statutes" are "at most differences of degree, not of kind";54 and no less a
positivist than Hart conceives of precedent as a device, co-equal with
legislation, for the communication of rules.55 We are not, however,
confined to invoking authority; a more positive defence is available.
For we can intelligibly argue that our version indeed accounts for
decisional law both because, for the positivist, decisional law can only be
intelligibly conceived in terms of the framework we have attributed to,
and think constitutive of, positivism and because decisional law shares
the same epistemic project which emerges from that framework.56 First a
question: what does the legal actor conceive himself as doing when he
undertakes case law research? Clearly - if he is a positivist - he, at
least, thinks himself as looking to the past; and, in this sense, case research
is really an archaeological activity57 in which the artifact of value is
decisional. But if that, to what purpose - why does the legal actor look
to the past? Again clearly: he looks to the past for guidance to the present.
And the guidance he seeks is rule guidance. The whole point of decisional
archaeology, as conceived by positivism, is precedential; and
precedentialism is a variety of rule following. One looks to the legal past
to find authoritative textual reason for constraining the present. Past
judgements legislate the present; and they are, in consequence, no
different from any other positum.
But not only that: because the legal past is textual to the same complete
degree precedentially as legislatively, decisional archaeology shares with
legislative commentary the same epistemic project. Like the legislative
53. See: Simmonds, supra, note 1, 106.
54. See: MacCormick, supra, note 2,214.
55. See: Concept, supra, note 5, 121f. One could add Dworkin, the protestant positivist, to this
list: see, Empire, supra, note 1, 99 (where he unceremoniously identifies legislation and
precedent as constitutive of legal practice) and 410 (where he describes the law as the practice
of "judges [deciding] what the law is by interpreting the practice of other judges deciding what
the law is").
56. This is not to say, however, that I accept the positivist construal of decisional law or, for
that matter, to deny that that construal cannot be criticized on any number of bases. For an
argument against the positivist version of case law, see: Simmonds, supra, note 1, Chp. 8, 106-
118.
57. Since adopting this metaphor - I thought originally, if derivatively [see: M. Foucault, The
Archaeology of Knowledge (1972), A. M. Sheridan, trans.)] - I have just recently, discovered
that it is not mine alone. See: Halpem, "Judicious Discretion: Miranda and Legal Change"
(1988), 2 Yale J. of Criticism 51, 55 (describing the judicial decision as "an exercise in
archaeology, a search for sources that consistently grants explanatory privilege and legitimating
authority to origins").
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commentator, the decisional archaeologist too must always proclaim, and
seek to demonstrate, his own fungibility: he is a rule-follower, he must
say, because he is not a rule-maker; and he is not a rule-maker, he must
show, because he discovers the rules out-there-in-the-(decisional) text.58
All of which is to say that the practices of both depend upon their
establishing a secure "epistemological footing";59 and that, in turn, is
merely to say that each is part and parcel of the positivist project.
2. Deep Structure
So far we have seen that the positive version of law as interpretive
activity arises from, and only makes sense in terms of, a dichotomous
view of law activity. On the one hand, there are rule makers - legislators
- who posit claims which are at once rules and authoritative by the very
act of positing. On the other hand, there are rule followers - all other
legal actors - who follow rules because they are posited and who can
follow rules because they are knowable. This taxonomy, in turn, arises
from, and only makes sense in terms of, another deeper division. This
latter division - which I henceforth term the deep structure of positivism
- comprises a taxonomy which seeks to describe not merely the
divisions of law activity, but the whole of human activity. It is critical that
we understand this deep structure not only because the positivist
enterprise cannot adequately be understood without it, but also because
the enterprise's theoretic fate, in the final analysis, rests with this structure.
Of what - we may properly inquire - does the act of legislating
consist? As defined by positivism, to legislate is to fabricate: it is an
activity of causing something to come into being. We have already
indentified that which is made as a rule. But we may now be able to see
that in the positivist world, cause and effect are one. The rule itself is the
act of fabrication: law is that which is made, that which is posited.
Through seeking to understand this positing activity more clearly, we
can, I think, disclose one dimension of the deep structure of positivism.
To posit is to assert; and to posit is, therefore, at once an act of will and
of power and of commitment. It is an act of will because to posit is to act:
it is a willing - an exercise of volition. But not only that: an exercise of
58. Dworkin has put this as successfully as anyone: it is "judge's duty, even in hard cases", he
says, "to discover what the rights of the parties are, not to invent new rights retrospectively".
See: TRS, supra, note 16,81. And note that my description of the positivist's proclamation
could be put another way - that interpretations are discoveries because they are not fungible
and they are not fungible because interpreters are fungible. I should add that we will shortly
discover (infra, Part III) that 'textual discovery requires that both the text and the interpreter
be constant and that it is through his fungibility that the interpreter is constant. See: infra note
92 and accompanying text.
59. I borrow this phrase from Quine: see W. Quine, From a Logical Point of View (1953) 44.
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will implicates power (which consists of the capacity to be will-full) and
desire (which consists in the willing-ness to exercise capacity). 60 The rule-
making portion of the positivist framework is, in its entirety, an
expression of this antecedent version of the qualities of human action. I
say antecedent in the very real sense that positivism's version of rule-
making is only intelligible in terms of a prior understanding of this sort
of the structure of human action; and I caution that this is completely the
case because, true to positivism's self-understanding, law-making as the
willing exercise of empowered will, is not only a manufacturing activity,
it is the manufacture itself.
Rule-following too has an antecedent structure. Where, however, the
deep structure of rule-making consists of a version of the meaning and
qualities of human action, the deep structure of rule-following is a version
of the meaning and qualities of human reason. We have already found
that the division between rule-making and rule-following is only
defensible and only intelligible in terms of an epistemic demonstration
which I have termed the positivist project. If we now reflect further on
the nature of that project, we will discern a version of human reason
which alone provides the vocabulary in terms of which the project is
possible.
To follow a rule is, before all else, to know the rule; and to know a rule
which is communicated textually is to interpret. We can now perhaps re-
fashion the positivist division as a division between willing (rule-making)
and knowing (rule-following). In order to maintain this division, a
particular kind of interpretive knowing is required. Simply: knowing
must exclude willing. The positivist project is, most fundamentally, a
programme to effect that exclusion through the adoption and deployment
of an epistemological idiom which not only permits the exclusion, but
ineluctably requires it.
I have already alluded to this idiom.6' It is a vocabulary of
estrangement between the knower and the world (in this case the textual
world) and between the knower and his biography. Knowing is separate
from willing in such a view of the circumstances of human knowing
because, in such a view, both the knowable and the knower are constant.
The text is an already-made object out-there-in-the-world; the interpreter
is constant because all interpreters are one and the same qua interpreters.
60. Existentially, of course, the order would be somewhat changed: power is primary because
it is the sine qua non of both willing and willingness; and willingness precedes willing because
it is always occasions and pre-conditions willing.
61. See: supra, note 58 and accompanying text. And we will, of course, refer to it in much
greater detail again: see, infra, Parts II.
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This view of the circumstances of human knowing is, ultimately, an
ontological claim; and that claim, in turn, is, in the final analysis, a
version of human knowing. Because meaning awaits us in the world,
knowing is discovery; and because the knower can transcend his
biography, discovery is methodologically the exercise of constraint. The
knower discovers because he can and does exclude his desires and
aspirations for the world. Knowing, in this sense, is an act of ontic
resignation: it exists where - and only where - the knower recognizes
and acts upon his incapacity as a knower, to influence the world. It is this
resignation that is the deep structure of the positivist version of rule-
following as knowing.
I am proposing, then, that the positivist edifice is constructed from
specific conceptual materials and that its architecture is a particular,
dichotomous version of the possibilities of human activity. I have
identified that version as the claim that willing and knowing are
constitutive of human activity and that willing and knowing are separate
and distinct. According to this claim, all human activities are either acts
of willing or acts of knowing: no human act is both simultaneously. This,
however, does not exhaust our analysis of deep structure because the
primary opposition of willing to knowing intricates a number of other
equally "binary oppositions" 62 to which the major opposition is
"indissolubly linked. ''63
Consider first willing: if willing is the exercise of an empowered and
desiring volition, how else must willing be construed? Clearly, it must, at
least, be construed as involving choice, otherwise the dimension of
empowerment makes no sense. Simply willing cannot both be
empowered and unfree. But if willing, therefore, necessarily implicates
free will, it also, in consequence, implicates a number of other dimensions
which are minimally constitutive of free will. The first of these is
arbitrariness. For a will to be free, it must be completely free: there can
be no prior constraint. A will is constrained if it is compelled in any
direction by a force other than itself. But to say that a will is not so
compelled is to say that the will is entirely self-directed - that it is purely
62. I take this term from Michael Ryan. See: M. Ryan, Marxism and Deconstructiom A
Critical Articulation (1982) 127. For the description that follows, I am indebted to the
following for providing opportunities for reflection: Kennedy, supra, note 31, 363f; Cavell,
"Politics as Opposed to What?" in The Politics of Interpretation, supra, note 23, 181; Schlag,
"Canmibal Moves: An Essay on the Metamorphoses of the Legal Distinction," (1988), 40 Stan.
L Rev. 929; Rorty, "The World Well Lost" in R. Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, (1982),
3; Hutchinson and Monahan, "The 'Rights' Stuff: Roberto Unger and Beyond", (1984) 62 Tex.
L Rev. 1477, esp. 1487f; Sullivan, supra, note 2, esp. 23-55, 60-72; Unger, supra; note 17, 29-
62; and G. Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism Post-Structuralism and Law (1984) 12-49.
63. I borrow this term from Taylor, supra, note 7, 469.
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a subject and never an object. This subjectivity is the second condition of
free willing and from it arise two further dimensions.
Those dimensions are creativeness and form; and while they are
conceptually distinct, they are, existentially, one and the same. The
exercise of subjectivity is creative because it is a making or a fabrication.
It is this because subjectivity, by definition, is not constrained and
because, in consequence, the exercise itself is that which is made. This
notion is often designated by use of the term value: the exercise of
subjectivity is a value exercise because there is nothing that compels the
exercise. The point under either guise remains, however, the same:
exercise of subjectivity is creative, or is a value exercise, because there is
no constraint.
Yet to declare that the exercise of subjectivity is a making and that -
because it is, by definition, unconstrained - that which is made is the
exercise itself, is also to declare that the exercise is purely a form. It is to
say, that is, that method and product are one - that what affords
subjectivity being is its form.
We have identified, then, a number of dimensions additional to the
primary deep structure of one part of the positivist framework. Willing,
we have found, intricates, and is constituted by, choice, arbitrariness (i.e.,
absence of constraint), subjectivity, creativeness (i.e., value) and form. It
should be noted again, however, that our inquiry has been confined to
identifying implications which are uncontroversial because logically
requisite; that our construction is, in consequence, minimalist; and that
more controversial and more constructions are possible.64
Knowing, too, implicates, and is constituted by, a number of additional
dimensions. In terms of our minimalist project, these dimensions are
antipodal to the dimensions we have identified as constitutive of willing,
namely: determinism, constraint, objectivity, fact and content. Knowing
is determined because it is constrained, and it is constrained because,
unlike willing, knowing is not arbitrary. Knowing, instead, is directed and
confined to the object of knowing which exists independent from, outside
of and prior to the knower. Knowing is other-directed and is defined by
that direction: it seeks the object by being objective. Unlike willing, it is,
therefore, not at all comprised of or equal to its form; just the contrary,
it is constituted by the other-ness which it discerns.
64. A feminist deconstruction of willing and knowing has been offered. According to this
view, willing is feminine because subjective and volitional and knowing male because objective
and cognitive. See: Ryan, supra, note 62, 121; Vickers, "Memoirs of and Ontological Exile:
The Methodological Rebellions of Feminist Research" in Feminism in Canada- From Pressure
to Politics (1982) 27, 30; and Grimshaw, supra, note 42, 36-74.
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We can catalogue our construction of the deep structure of positivism
in the following fashion:
RULE-MAKING RULE-FOLLOWING
WILLING KNOWING
Choice Determined
Arbitrary Constraint
Subjective Objective
Value Fact
Form Content
This catalogue should be read sequentially. The surface dichotomy
between rule-making and rule-following requires - because it is other
wise unintelligible - a deeper structural dichotomy between willing and
knowing. And this structure in turn requires - because it is constituted
by - the additional structural dimensions of choice/determinism,
arbitrariness/constraint, subjective/objective, value/fact, and form/
content.
Our catalogue can be described in either of two fashions depending
upon whether one stresses the dichotomy as a whole or the knowing
activity on one side. If the former, the structure may be aptly termed
either Kantian, because it emphasizes the "conviction" that discovery is
different from creation,65 or Humian, because it articulates a distinction
between fact (is) and value (ought). If, instead, the knowing side alone is
our focus, then Cartesian is apt because, according to both Descartes and
this structure, knowing is a relation between the mind (the cogito) and
the mind's object (the res cogito). Whichever description is used, the
lesson from their availability is that positivism is a localized deposit of a
larger, pan-locational tradition in the history of ideas. This instruction is
useful because it can cause us to mine the deposit further and more
widely.
III. Theoretical Requirements
I wish to argue that the framework and structural buttresses which I have
just briefly described necessarily found a number of "very deep needs
within positivist legal theory" 66 and that the positivist enterprise can only
be sustained if those needs are completely satisfied. The needs to which
I refer are of two categories - one category concerns the rightness of the
positive enterprise and the other the validity of the positivist project. Both
65. See: Rorty, supra, note 62.
66. See: Simmonds, supra, note 1, 100.
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concern the relation between law-making and law-following; yet they are
different needs because the need for rightness arises from, and in terms of,
the deep structure of willing, while the need for validity arises from, and
in terms of, the deep structure of knowing.
More precisely put, the needs are these: positivism needs to
demonstrate that the division between law-making and law-following
ought and can be sustained. In this section, I shall attempt to articulate
fully each of these needs. We will find that positivism translates its needs
into an idiom of moral and epistemic claims.
1. The Moral Claim
It is not then for judges and lawyers as such to pass a judgment of superior
wisdom upon the decisions of the political nation. Their proper role is wise
and faithful application of the law as it issues from those political
decisions. They need to have criteria for what counts as law, but, in
interpreting and applying whatever counts as law by these criteria, they are
not themselves to be bothered with issues of political theory in the grand
manner.... [T]he law, once made, is binding law which the courts just
have to apply.
- Neil MacCormick67
[E]ven when no settled rule disposes of the case ... it remains the judge's
duty... to discover what the rights of the parties are ....
- Ronald Dworkin6s
Positivism asserts that law-making and law-following are categorically
different activities. This assertion defines what I earlier referred to as the
positivist project - the search for a conclusive demonstration of the
cleavage between making and following. Let us now suppose that the
search were successful and that positivism, in consequence, were able to
sustain the division epistemologically. Would that demonstration alone
suffice to defend the division? The answer to this question, I think, is
quite obviously no.
The epistemic demonstration is necessary, but it is not, without more,
sufficient because positivism must assert not ony that rule-following is
possible, but also that it is proper. That is, its claim is not merely
methodological; it is also necessarily moral. This is so because the
possibility of following is not equivalent to the propriety of following.69
67. See: N. MacCormick, H. LA. Hart (1981) 4,5.
68. See: TRS, supra, note 16, 81.
69. Simply, "can" says nothing about and, certainly, does not imply "ought". The converse is
somewhat different: while "ought" does not imply "can", it is clearly says something about
"can", if "can" is otherwise possible.
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There must, therefore, be an additional demonstration - of why
following, even if possible, ought to constitute practice.
Logically at least, this second demonstration ought comprise a theory
of restraint. This theory differs from the theory of constraint which
positivism's epistemic claim engenders7" in the following very direct
fashion: instead of seeking to prove - as does the theory of constraint -
that interpreters are constrainable, the theory of restraint will seek to
convince that interpreters ought restrain themselves so as to permit - to
let - ihemselves be constrained.
This moral claim has a mixed and unsure status in positivist theory.
Indeed, it has generally been conceived less as a claim and more as a
context in which to articulate issues subsequent and subsidiary to the
epistemic demonstration. 71
2. The Epistemic Claim
[L]aw is not a matter of personal or partisan politics.
- Ronald Dworkin72
[T]he primary role of jurisprudence is to provide a legal epistemology, a
theory of legal knowledge.
- Neil MacCormick 73
[T]he desire for a theory of knowledge is a desire for constraint - a desire
to find "foundations" to which one might cling, frameworks beyond
which one must not stray, objects which impose themselves, representa-
tions which cannot be gainsaid.
- Richard Rorty74
I earlier 75 proposed that the positivist framework necessarily implicates a
project which is epistemic in nature. This is so, I argued, because rule-
following is only possible if rules are, in some way or another, knowable.
70. And with which I deal immediately following.
71. I am here referring to the deployment of the whole question of fidelity to law as a context
in which to deal with the moral limits of legal epistemology, particularly as regards, what
Dworkin calls, "wicked legal systems". See: Empire, supra, note 1, 105-109, 202-204; and
TRS, supra, note 16, 327. I elsewhere argue (see: supra, note 7) that this state of affairs is not
at all accidental; it, rather, resonates complex value sentiments and theoretic interdependencies
from deep within positivist theory.
72. See: Dworkin, "Law as Interpretation", supra, note 23.
73. See: McCormick, "Analytical Jurisprudence and the Possibility of Legal Knowledge"
(1985), 49 Saslc L Rev. 1, 3. See also: MacCormick, "On Analytical Jurisprudence" in N.
MacCormick and 0. Weinberger, An Institutional Theory of Law: New Approaches to Legal
Positivism (1986) 93.
74. See: R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979) 315.
75. See: supra, Part I.
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The assertion "can follow" is equivalent to and requires the assertion
"can know"; and knowledge is, therefore, a necessary condition for the
practice of rule-following. 76 I now want to explore the project's
foundations in greater depth and finer detail in order to disclose more
fully both its meaning and its ambitions.
The positivist research for an epistemology - and, indeed, the division
between rule-making and rule-following itself - only arises because of
an antecedent assertion which is ontological in nature.77 The assertion is
this: that there is, out-there, a legal world comprised of distinctively legal
objects which are properly the stuff of legal cognition. It is only because
there is such a world that the "epistemological goal" 78 is at all possible:
one can only frame that end-in-view if one asserts (or assumes) that there
is something, of some sort or another, to be known, in some way or
another.79
Now, we have already found that for the positivist, what is out-there
is, minimally and paradigmatically, 0 the rule-bearing text. We can,
therefore, perhaps refashion the more general assertion: what is out-there
is an interpretandum and that "thing to be interpreted" is the object of
legal cognition.81 I now want to argue that this assertion determines both
the nature of and the truth conditions for the positivist project. Before
undertaking that argument, however, I want first to associate the
assertion with what may be termed the source thesis.
The term "source thesis" was coined by Joseph Raz82 and it is thought
in many quarters as definitive of positivism.8 3 Whether or not that is the
case with respect to Raz's definition is not at issue here; nor, for that
76. But it is not - I say again - a sufficient condition.
77. The assertion may not, however, be a conscious one; and, in that event, the prior ontic
understanding is really an assumption.
78. See: Soper, supra, note 35, 7.
79. By reason of this qualification, the positivist assertion is not necessarily essentialist (see:
J. N. Shklar, Legalism (1964) 32-35) and, indeed, modem positivists say that it is not (see: Raz,
supra, note 2, 37; and Soper, supra, note 35,7). Even, however, if the end-in-view is
description (as in Hart - see, Concep4 supra, note 5, v; and in Dworkin - see, TRS, supra,
note 16, 90: his rights thesis, says Dworkin, "presents not some novel information about what
judges do, but a new way of describing what we all know they do .. ."), that changes neither
the ontic typology nor the methodological requirement because description requires both that
there be something out-there to describe and that it be accessible methodologically.
80. But this implies and requires nothing with respect to how the text is defined. Dworkin, for
instance, defines the text as including not only institutional history, but institutional morality
as well.
81. This phrase is Dworkin's: see, Empire, supra, note 1, 79.
82. See, supra, note 1, 47.
83. See, for instance: Simmonds, supra, note 1, 99; and Perry, "Judicial Obligation, Precedent
and The Common Law", (1987) 704 J. Leg. Stud 215,226-230.
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matter, is his definition.84 I wish instead briefly to offer a general
description of the thesis and then to argue that a source thesis of this
general variety is, indeed, definitive of positivism, not - as is generally
understood - as a premise, but as a consequence.
An occupation with the sources of law is not Raz's alone - indeed,
every positivist appears to deploy a thesis of some kind or another
concerning the sources of law.85 Whence, we may ask, this belief in
sources; and is it a necessary incident of positivism? I take the view that
the source belief is a corollary to positivism's founding ontological
assertion and that it is, therefore, a necessary consequence of the positivist
programme. 86
Positivists must subscribe to a source thesis of some sort. This is so
because positivists declare both that law is out-there and that law is
posited. That is, if law is indeed out-there and if law is not - because it
is posited - a natural phenomenon, then it must have a source. Versions
of positivism can be said to differ in terms of their definitions of source.
The difference, for instance between a Dworkin and a Hart is that the
one, and not the other, includes institutional morality, and not merely
institutional history, in his interpretandum and that difference is directly
a function of their different versions of the sources of law. In any case, we
can now say that positivist ontology necessarily implicates the source
thesis and that a source thesis, however defined, is, in the result, a
necessary consequential incident of positivism.
This excursus permits us to take the next step in our exploration of the
positivist project. I want now to argue that the possibility for, and the
nature of, positivism's epistemic goal arises only in terms of the prior
ontological assertion we have just been discussing. I will make the
following argument: that the source thesis - the claim that what is out-
there is identifiable by source - defines a further requirement which can
only be met in terms of a two part methodology which I shall designate
the autonomy thesis.
84. For a good critical review of Raz's thesis, see: Perry, ibid
85. Hart's rule of recognition (see: Concept supra, note 5, 92 and 97-107) is, for instance,
clearly a thesis with respect to the sources of law; so too is Dworkin's rights thesis and the
Herculean methodology which arises from it (see: TRS, supra, note 16,870. What the
different varieties of the thesis share, I think, is this: they believe that "legal rules can be
identified by their source" (see: Simmonds, supra, note 1, 99). And they differ, in terms how
they define source. Compare, for instance, Raz ("the sources of a law are those facts by virtue
of which it is valid and which identify its content": see, supra, note 1, 47-48) and Hart (a "rule
of recognition is ... used for the identification of primary rules of obligation": see, Concept
supra, note 5, 97): each views source as a means of identifying what is and is not law although
they differ in their views about what the source is.
86. And I elsewhere argue (see supra, note 7) that it is truly and completely a belief - that
positivism in effect "espouses a myth of origins": see, Halpern supra, note 57, 53.
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The source thesis, however defined in the particular, asserts that "what
law is and is not is a matter of social fact".87 We have already discovered
that the social fact in question is an interpretandum (again, as however
defined) deposited by a legal positor (yet again, as however defined).
Now in what sense does it make sense to say that an interpretandum is
a fact? Clearly it makes sense historically: the interpretandum is a fact at
least in the sense that, from the interpreter's perspective, it exists now and
is, therefore, of and from the past. But that sense is both obvious and
theoretically incomplete.88 It also makes sense - and, ultimately, can
only be made to make sense theoretically - if the interpretandum has a
correct meaning. For an interpretandum to be a fact, other than in an
historic sense, its meaning must be factual; and for its meaning to be
factual, its meaning must be a truth-matter. Otherwise the source thesis
is self-contradicting: it would be declaring both that we can identify what
the law is as a historic matter, but that we cannot identify what it means
as an interpretive matter.
We are now in a position to inquire under what conditions of
interpretation, meaning may be factual in this sense. We can inquire, that
is, what must be true for meaning to be a matter of truth. The positivist
is driven to a two part reply to this inquiry. He must assert firstly, that the
text - the what(ever) is out-there - in some fashion and to some
appreciable degree constrains the interpreter; and, secondly, he must
claim that the interpreter is, by nature, constrainable. He must make these
claims because constraint is a threshold condition for textual truth. If
there be no constraint, meaning cannot be a truth matter. For if it is not
possible to confine meaning, it is not at all possible to speak of
discernment among meanings; and truth and validity require just such
talk because truth and validity constitute - they are - discernments.
Only if the universe of meaning is somehow limitable, does it make sense
to speak of truth and validity because only then can meanings be
unequal.
87. See: Raz, supra, note 71, 37. I am, of course, aware that some positivists, including most
notably Dworkin (see: Empire, supra, note 1, 429 n3), deny just this. I elsewhere seek to
convince (see supra, note 7) that their denials are shallow inasmuch as what they are ultimately
disagreeing with is not that law has sources, but what those sources are. It is, in any case, clear
that theorists such as Dworkin think meaning a truth matter (see: ibid, 77, 88, 110, 262 and
265) and that they, in consequence, arrive at the same position that the source thesis would
otherwise destine them. If a Dworkin were then to rejoin that destination does not require the
cartography of the source thesis, we would then be disagreeing only about road maps and not
about geography.
88. For this reason: because, for the positivist, law is, at a minimum, a textual phenomenon,
identification is a two stage process - the positivist must identify both what the law is and
what the law means. The historic is necessary to, but it is not sufficient for, identification
because while it can tell the positivist what the law is, it cannot tell him what the law means.
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The positivist's first claim is a formalist one. 9 By formalism, I mean
simply the assertion that the text constricts the interpreter's choice of
meaning. The methodology of the constriction is variously construed; but
all positivist constructions share an understanding of the meaning of
formalism. Formalism does not contend that the interpreter is without
choice; it contends, rather, that only certain choices are proper.9°
Constraint is, therefore, evaluative and not prohibitive. The claim is not
that many meanings are not possible; it is, rather, that only some
meanings are proper. Indeed, it is only because texts are so fecund that
constraint becomes at issue; if texts were not fecund and if, in
consequence, many meanings were not possible, texts would constrain in
a prohibitive sense and a theory of constraint would be both unnecessary
and frivolous.
This version of constraint imposes a specific theoretic onus on
positivism: for the enterprise to succeed, a theory of how texts constrain
must be constructed. Such a theory will consist of a definition of valid
meaning, which usually takes the form of defining what constitutes the
text. Given the premise of fecundity and the objective of propriety, this
89. Discussion of formalism has a long and very confused history in the legal academy (see,
for instance: R. Moore, Legal Norms and Legal Science" A Critical Study of Kelsen's Pure
Theory (1978) 18-19 - " 'Formalism' is a term that has established currency both in
jurisprudence and in philosophy. In both arenas, the term has acquired ambiguous reference
through unsystematic and uncritical employment.").
For a summative analysis and bibliography of the legal academic discussion, see: Schauer,
"Formalism" (1988), 97 YaleL J. 509, esp. with respect to bibliography, 510 NI. See also the
discussion in Shklar, supra, note 79, 33-39.
For a recent discussion which seeks to contrast formalism (conceived as the "immanent
moral rationality" of "legal phenomena" which separates law from politics) with "the thinner
formalism of positivism" (which according to the author, "contrasts the formal principle of
legal validity with the material content of law and thus makes the notion of law as such
indifferent to the law's content"), see: Weinrib, "Legal Formalism: On the Immanent
Rationality of Law" (1988), 97 Yale L J 949, 954, 964, 954n 14. Under the view taken here,
Weinrib's attempt to salvage the "law's autonomy" (ibid, 95) - through I think its
hellenization - is fundamentally an attempt to salvage a very positivist version of law. For law
remains for him constituted (ibid, 1005) by the cleavage between law-making (the political)
and law interpreting (the judicial); judicial work is conceived by him (ibid, 956) as "essentially
cognitive" - "more ... the discovery than ... the making of law"; the objects of judicial
conguition continue to be (ibid, 957) "the doctrines, institutions and decisions of positive law";
and truth (ibid, 972: which, like Dworkin, he defines as coherence) remains the fundamental
criterion of valid cognition. Likewise, under the view taken here, Weinrib confuses formalism
with objectivity - which is to say, with the second of positivism's claims (see: infra, note 91
and accompanying text); for if the view taken here is correct, it is the objective and not the
formalist claim which asserts that there is a "legal mode of intelligibility that goes beyond the
physical, the positive, the historical or the sociological" (ibid, 958; see also 973).
90. See for instance: Empire, supra, note 1, 67 ("He [the interpreter] also needs convictions
about how far the justification he proposes at the interpretive stage must fit the standing
features of the practice to count as an interpretation of it rather than the invention of something
new").
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is not at all surprising: in this view which meanings are proper, properly
depends upon how the text is defined because by defining the text one is
at once defining the ambit of validity.
We have seen, however, that formalism is not the only claim to which
the positivist is wedded. His ontic assumption requires him to assert not
only that texts constrain but also that interpreters are constrainable. This
is so because a theory of constraint is, by itself, an incomplete and,
indeed, an empty demonstration: only if the interpreter is, in some sense
or another, prey to the text, does it matter that texts constrain. I shall
designate the claim that interpreters are the prey of texts, objectivist. In
consequence, as used here, objectivity neither can nor does refer to either
interpretive methodology or to the quality of the interpretive product,
both of which matters are, instead, properly the substance of the formalist
claim.9' Rather, as used here, objectivity refers to the relationship of the
interpreter to his biography and, more specifically, to the proposition that
the interpreter can transcend and stand apart from his particular situation.
This version of objectivity is required by the very object and nuance of
positivist inquiry. If interpretations can only be differentiated if texts
constrain, it only matters that texts constrain if interpreters are
constrainable. But what does it mean to say interpreters are
constrainable? It, at least, must mean that he is available and accessible
to the text's instruction with respect to interpretive choice - that, as I put
it earlier, he can be prey to its lesson. But, if that is the case, we can
inquire what would make him inaccessible. The answer, clearly, is his
particularity. If a text can only constrain if it is constant - and it
becomes constant through definition of what constitutes the text -
91. Though much used, the term "objectivity" is most times deployed in an unspecified and,
in consequence, terribly unclear fashion. A splendid example of this is Christie's, "Objectivity
in the Law" (1969), 78 Yale L J. 1311 which throughout fails to define precisely what
objectivity is; a recent attempt to be much more definitive is Schlag, supra, note 62, esp. 942-
944. For a discussion - which I do not to pursue here - of the meanings of objectivism, see:
Fiskin, "Liberal Thought and the Problem of Justification" in Nomos XXVXI: Jusfication
(1986, J. R. Pennock and J. W Chapman, eds.), 207, 208-214; J. S. Fiskin, Beyond Subjective
Morality: Ethical Reasoning and Political Philosophy (1984) 10-13, 17; and Morality and
Objectivity (1985, T. Honderich, ed.).
I take the legal academy's law and interpretation literature (see: infra, note 102) as using the
term in two, related fashions. The first use is methodological: that there exists a methodology
for discerning what is really out-there. The second is evaluative: that there exists a standard for
assessing the truth or falsity of the products of interpretation. They are related because the
standard in the second sense generally consists of a statement of the methodology in the first
sense. These uses, in my view, confuse objectivity with formalism. What is more important,
however, is that they confuse as primary what are really effects and applications of a more
fundamental use. As will become apparent, the fundamental use to which I refer is "the
transcendence of self". See: T Nagel, Mortal Questions (1979) 209. See also, his The View
From Nowhere (1986) 17.
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equally, an interpreter can only be constrained by the text if he too is
constant.92 The interpreter must be everywhere, and every time, the same
because otherwise the project of constraint is not at all possible. An
unvarying text cannot constrain a varying interpreter because if the
interpreter varies, the possibility of choice is not only fecund, it is infinite.
The constraining text would, in a sense, be without a target, and
interpretive choice would be affected in diverse and unpredictable and, in
the result, project-defeating ways. And note: one cannot avoid this
requirement by permitting the text itself to vary simply because a varying
text cannot constrain. Constancy is a complete requirement: texts can
only constrain if their instruction is constant over time and interpreters
are only constrainable if they are uniformly prey to that instruction.
In this light, the interpreter is every bit as much an object for the text
as is the text an object for him: each is, in a sense, out-there for the other.
And for there to be validity discernment among interpretations, not only
the text, but the interpreter too must be constant. As with the text, the
interpreter can only be constant if he is limitable. Since particularity is the
antithesis of limitability, it is the interpreter's particularity that is the
object of limitation. The proper interpreter is this limited interpreter. He
is the fungible interpreter to which I earlier referred - fungible because
he is everywhere and every time the same. He transcends his, and every
other, time: he is a transtemporal and transsocial subject, alien to every
place and time, and at home only in his unchanging accessibility to the
text. And so a second theoretic onus: positivism must show how the
autobiographic interpreter "counts for nothing" in "the epiphany of the
law"93 by showing interpretation to be an autarkic enterprise in no need
of the biographic stuff of situation.
Together these theoretic requirements constitute what I wish to call the
autonomy thesis. It is a thesis in two parts, the first being that the text is
autonomous from the interpreter and the second, that the interpreter is
autonomous from his biography. We should notice again that the first
part arises because of positivism's formalism, and not because of its
objectivism,94 and that it does not, in consequence, commit positivists to
any one definition of the text. Just the opposite is the case with the second
part: because the autonomy at issue here arises from the claim of
92. See for instance: Rosen, "The Limits of Interpretation" in Literature and the Question of
Philosophy (1987, A. J. Cascardi, ed.) 213, 215 ("If there is no human nature that remains
constant within historical change, and so that defines the perspectives of individual readers...,
then reading is impossible").
93. See: P. Legendre, LAmourdu Censeur(1974) 96.
94. This has long - if not unanimously - been understood. See: Michaels, "Against
Formalism: The Autonomous Text in Legal and Literary Theory", (1979) 1 Poetics Today 23.
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objectivity, positivists are committed to a very specific definition of the
interpreter as transcendental subject.
Two final notes before I offer some concluding remarks. The
autonomy thesis arises, I have argued, from - and only because of -
the founding ontic assertion that there is out-there something that can
serve as the object of legal cognition. I now want to suggest that not only
is the epistemic thesis ontological in origin, it is also ontological in effect.
That is, the founding assertion not only makes possible the epistemic
project, it defines its success in ontological terms. For the effect of
showing that the text constrains and that the interpreter is constrainable
is to assert that there is a natural ontology in which humans forever find
themselves. According to this view, human existence is, at least in its
knowing part, constituted by the interaction of transcending subjects with
eternal texts. 95
I have not so far mentioned another matter which since the American
realists has often been thought to be the central claim and soft underbelly
of positivism.9s I refer, of course, to the claim to determinacy in law
application. My delay has been intentional. For, in my view, this claim
is merely another - and not so illuminating - expression of positivism's
epistemic project and of its autonomy thesis. This is so because to say that
law-applying is possible is to say that law-following is possible; and if that
be the case, then it is also to implicate all the same theoretic requirements.
The trouble with this usage, however, is that it conceals more than it
reveals in that regard. Realism stands in witness to this: it is a record of
obsession with objectivity which misses entirely the antecedent assertions
in terms of which alone objectivity is either a contention or contentious.
IV. Conclusion
You must not let yourself be seduced by the terminology in common
currency.
Wittgenstein 97
Positivism is the common currency of legal theory, practice and
education. 98 It provides the vocabulary and grammar in which current
95. This applies equally to scientific knowledge: for the positivist, science is distinctive not
because it exhibits an ontic typology different from interpretation, but because its text is
different. See Dworkin's comments in this regard in Empire, supra, note 1; 49-53.
96. See, for instance: J. Frank, Law and the Modem Mind (1949, 6th ed.) Preface and
Chs. 5, 12.
97. L. Wittgenstein, Culture and Value (1980, G. H. Von Wright, ed.; P. Winch, trans.) 74e.
98. By common, I mean dominant; and I do not, therefore, mean to imply, nor do I believe,
that there are no exceptions to dominant discourse. Precisely, however, because we perceive
these discourses as exceptions, we experience them as marginal, which is to say, as both
ineffective and unendorsed. See: infra, note 103 and accompanying text.
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forms of inquiry are articulated and undertaken - the problems we
perceive and the practices we pursue are positivist in origin and in yield.
I have taken the view that all of this is so by insinuation because our
assent has been neither given nor requested. On the contrary, positivism
is for us seduction and we are beguiled by it.99
I began by proposing that the evanescence of positivism expresses our
enchantment. We can only take seriously questions concerning the nature
and, indeed, the very existence of positivism, because positivism so
pervades our perspective. It is the weave of our understanding of the
world-in-law, of our conceptions of the points of inquiry and of the
universe of solutions, which can possibly be legal. Our seduction is
complete because we have, in this fashion, come to belong to positivism.
In this essay, I have sought to establish a foundation for curing this
possession. 00 My project has been to make positivism appear as theory
by defining its project and proposals as theory. Success in this is
fundamental to a cure because we can come, I believe, critically to assess
our situation only through distance and because distance is fundamental
to definition. 0 1 But none of this is to say why a cure is at all desirable;
indeed, to declare that a cure is required is, without more, to assume a
pathology. I wish, therefore, to conclude this essay with some brief
comments about both the present pathology of legal theory and the
threshold requirements for any future theory.
The malady, I believe, is simply this: enchantment has led to
enchainment. We are captivated by the positivist version and have, in
consequence, become incapable of speaking of or to alternative theoretic
99. This is not to imply that our deception is accidental. It could be argued, for instance, that
legal education is itself a practice of seduction. For it is in law school that we - the lawyers
of this culture - first become disabused of other vantages; and it is there too that we finally
come to see law as "a body of practices observed and ideas received by a caste of lawyers" (see:
Simpson, "The Common Law and Legal Theory" in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Second
Series) (1973, A. W. B. Simpson, ed.) 75,94. Although he has yet to articulate a theory of legal
education, some of Dworkin's views appear to lend support to this argument. According to
Dworkin, which practices are, at any given moment, legal practices is a matter of "initial
agreement" among "the lawyers of any culture" (see: Empire, supra, note 1, 91). And he seems
to point to legal education as the source of consensus: "Each lawyer has joined the practice of
law with that furniture in place and with a shared understanding that these institutions
[previously indentified as: "legislatures and courts and administrative agencies and bodies, and
the decisions these institutions make... reported in an canonical way"] together form our legal
system. (ibid)." If this is so, then legal education would appear to be the acquiescence in a
specific form of initiation, the deposit of which is the very positivist pre-theoretical weld that
binds the lawyer's cognitive furniture. See: supra; note 25.
100. But I do not conceive the prescription I offer as a complete cure. Further steps are
required: see, infra notes 107 and 108 and accompanying text.
101. Which is to say: because definition requires reflection, it serves both to remove us as
participants and to render us spectators.
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futures in law. Instead of articulating new vocabularies, our common
practice is to defend - and to defend again - the grammar of the
present.10 2 And because this is our practice, alternative vocabularies
which do emerge' 03 become marginalized and trivialized. They are
perceived as (and perhaps even conceive themselves as) thoughts more
visionary than versionary,1°4 projects less productive than poetic,
paradigms which are in conception and reception without practitioners.
Concealment, in this fashion, both invites and produces containment.
Because the theoretic substance and structure of present theory and
practice has, through our inattention, l0s become covered by that practice,
we experience the present form of practice as incontestable and other
102. This is perhaps no better demonstrated than in current law and interpretation scholarship
which, in very short order, has come to occupy very nearly the whole of our theoretic
vocabulary. Rather than using its discovery (concerning which, see: "Law and Literature: A
Symposium" (1982), 60 Teax L Rev. 373-586; and "Symposium on Interpretation" (1985), 58
& Calif. L Rev. 1-713) of the philosophy of interpretation as an occasion for theory
development, the legal academy has, instead, deployed hermeneutics as a novel strategy for
shoring the buttresses of the positivist present. The style is new but the project and proposals
remain the same. Law as interpretation is, in consequence, merely a fashionable addendum to
the past; and its discovery that positivism is fundamentally a proposal about interpretation has
lost whatever critical bite it might otherwise have had.
For a sampling of the vast interpretation literature (and in addition, of course, to Dworkin's
Empire, supra, note 1), see especially the long running debate between Owen Fiss and Stanley
Fish, on the one hand, and Dworkin and Fish on the other: Fiss, "Objectivity and
Interpretation" (1982), 34 Stan. L Rev. 739, and "Conventionalism" (1985), 58 & Calif L
Rev. 177; Dworkin, "Law as Interpretation", supra, note 23, and "Please Don't Talk About
Objectivity Any More", ibid, 287; and Fish, "Fish v. Fiss" (1984), 36 Stan. L Rev. 1325,
"Working On the Chain Gang: Interpretation in the Law and in Literary Criticism", supra,
note 23, 271, "Wrong Again" (1983), 62 Texi L Rev. 299 and "Still Wrong After All These
Years" (1987), 6 Law & Phil 401.
103. And they do indeed occasionally emerge. I am not referring to the various deconstructive
vocabularies adopted by critical scholars in their continuing assault on dominant practice.
Alternative proposals are only very rarely a product of such criticism; indeed, scholars engaged
in critical practice appear deliberately to postpone theory construction (see, for instance:
Bauman, "The Communitarian Vision of Critical Legal Studies" (1988), 33 McGill L J. 295,
arguing that the postponement of alternative proposals is a "paradox" that afflicts critical
scholarship). I refer, instead, to vocabularies developed - albeit in a very piecemeal,
disconnected and often disparate fashion - by critical and other scholars, which in my view,
together signal the emergence of the truly alternative proposal of law as cultural praxis. See for
instance: Klare, "Law-Making As Praxis" (1979), 40 Telos 123, esp. 124 N4, 128-133;
Gordon, "Critical Legal Histories" (1984), 36 Stan L Rev. 57, 102-116;.Cover, "Nomos and
Narrative" (1983), 97 Harp, L Rev. 1, 1-19; Hunt, "The Theory of Critical Legal Studies"
(1986), 6 0x
. 
J. Leg. Stud 1, 37-43; M. S. Ball, Lying Down Together: Law, Metaphor and
Theology (1985), esp. chps. 2 & 6; and J. B. White, Heracles'Bow: Essays on the Rhetoric and
Politics of Law (1985), esp. chp. 2. I intend to pursue this alternative for theory in a subsequent
essay: see, "Meanings of Law: Law as Civil Strategy, Law as Cultural Praxis" (forthcoming).
104. For a discussion of the distinction between visions and versions, see: supra, note 6.
105. This is not to say our inattention is accidental; it may, in fact, be manufactured. for
discussion, see, supra, notes 25 & 99.
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forms as unthinkable. Theoretical discourse thereby becomes contained
by and the willing captive of the present.
The project foundational to any future theory is to give us cause to
disentangle ourselves from the positivist present. Remembering' °6 is the
first step in such a project. We must come to recognize the positivist
foundations of our present projects and discourse by coming to see that
they arise from, and are only intelligible in terms of, those foundations.
The present essay is a contribution to the revival of memory in this sense.
But retrieval alone is not sufficient. We must then come to terms
intellectually with the positivism we have recovered. This, I think, raises
two further requirements. First we must become sensitive to positivism as
a moral and political vision; 1°7 and this we can only do by uncovering the
moral, social and political predicates and proposals which inhere in its
literature. Second, we must inquire whether such a vision of polity is
defensible. By defensible, I do not mean morally desirable or
descriptively accurate. The inquiry, rather, is theoretical: we must ask
whether this vision presents a choice which we must later address on
moral grounds because it arises from a version of law which is itself
defensible. 08
Each of the stages in this project can be pursued without our normative
engagement in alternative proposals. But - and this is the crux - the
converse is not the case. Unless we become sensitive to our present
practices in these fashions, no new sensibility is possible. Until, that is, we
address the structure and significance of our situation, our theory will
continue to be a resignation to the present and an abdication of the future.
106. If our inability to see positivism is manufactured (see: supra, notes 105, 99 and 25), then
remembering will in large measure become a practice of consciousness-raising.
107. For a discussion of the relationship between positivism as a epistemic project and moral,
political and social theory, see: supra, note 7.
108. I propose to pursue both these tasks elsewhere: see, supra, note 7.
